Our goal is to see if the court really is as unconstrained as the attitudinal model says it is.
different agendas. Comparing them directly would be as problematic as comparing students' test scores on different tests. Is a student who scores an 87 on one test more mathematically inclined than a student who scores a 75 on a different test? Surely a student who gets an 87 by adding three digit numbers is not more mathematically capable than a student who got a 75 solving differential equations. Similarly, if Justice William Brennan voted conservatively 19% of the time on the court and Representative Connie Morella (R, MD) voted conservatively 20% of the time in the House of Representatives (as they did in the samples of votes in our data set), would we have any confidence in saying that they have the same preferences?
A second challenge arises from the need to compare preferences over time. Just as Justice David Souter voted on different issues than did members of Congress, so too did Justice Souter face a different set of cases than Justice Lewis Powell. If Souter voted in a liberal direction more often than Powell, do we conclude that Souter was more liberal than Powell?
Or is it a reflection that the Court's agenda during Souter's tenure was different the Court's agenda during Powell's tenure?
This chapter provides a framework for addressing these issues. First, we establish that measurement matters. While no one doubts the technical basis for concerns about crossinstitutional and cross-time comparability, some may believe that simple measures provide valid results without the headache and complication inherent in more technically sophisticated approaches. In this context, however, simple does not suffice. In fact, even some of the most prominent approaches are flawed. We show specific examples of how existing approaches to inter-institutional and cross temporal measurement fail, sometimes rather dramatically.
Second, we build an inter-institutional and inter-temporal measurement model.
1 Key to the approach is the use of "bridging" techniques that link actors across time and institutions.
To bridge across institutions, we incorporate data on presidents and members of Congress In subsequent chapters we demonstrate that the approach is valid for more than just ideal point estimation, as we build on this approach to assess other influences on the court.
A Spatial Model of Supreme Court Decision-Making
Spatial models provide the foundation for measuring Supreme Court preferences. These models have a long pedigree and are standard in the literature (Downs 1957; Martin, Quinn and Epstein 2005) . In them, individuals have "ideal points" in policy space that maximize their utility. Policy alternatives are points in that preference space, and individuals prefer spatially closer alternatives. Following standard spatial theory, a justice will vote for the defendant if his or her ideal point is on the same side of the midway point between the outcomes associated with voting for the defendant and plaintiff (which we refer to as the vote "cutpoint"). In the figure, justices one through five support the defendant and justices six through nine support the plaintiff. More concretely, suppose a liberal justice such as Justice Stevens has an ideal point of -1 while a conservative justice such as Justice Scalia has an ideal point of +1. If a case presented justices with the alternatives of voting to free a defendant (with a hypothetical policy outcome of -0.8) or to convict a defendant (with a hypothetical policy outcome of +0.6), Stevens would prefer to free the defendant and Scalia would prefer to convict. 
Comparing preferences across institutions
Our first task is to estimate preferences in a manner that allows us to directly compare preferences of actors who operate in different institutions. This would be a simple task if justices voted on congressional roll calls and members of Congress voted on Supreme Court cases. In that case, we could directly apply any of the advanced measurement approaches in the literature (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . Unfortunately reality is not so accommodating.
One solution commonly employed assumes that preference estimates for members of one institution are directly comparable to preference estimates produced for another institution.
For example, Segal (1997) the top is a hypothetical court with judges with ideal points at J 1 , J 2 and J 3 . This court ruled on two cases. In the first, the cutpoint between the two alternatives was K 1 ; in the second, the cutpoint was K 2 . The ideal point of the judge J 3 is greater than both cutpoints.
If there is no randomness, this judge will vote conservatively 100 percent of the time. The ideal point of the median judge (J 2 ) is greater than K 1 , but less than K 2 , leading this judge to vote liberally once and conservatively once. The ideal point of the most liberal judge is less than both cutpoints, yielding no conservative votes.
In the next two panels are hypothetical legislatures whose legislators have ideal points at L 1 through L 5 . The legislature voted on legislation that had cutpoints at K 3 and K 4 .
The challenge of making inter-institutional preference comparisons
Two conservative legislators had ideal points above both cutpoints, implying a 100 percent conservative rating. The median legislator's ideal point was higher than the first cutpoint (implying one conservative vote) and lower than the second cutpoint (implying one liberal vote). Two liberal legislators' ideal points were below both cutpoints, implying a 0 percent conservative rating.
If we measure preferences based on voting within each of the two institutions, we cannot know whether the depiction in the middle panel (where the legislative median is far to the left of the court median) or the bottom panel (where the legislative median is far to the right of the court median) is correct. Either depiction is logically possible, even as they differ dramatically from each other. More sophisticated within-institution preference estimation will not solve this fundamental inter-institutional problem.
This is not merely a technical problem. Figure 2 .3 compares two plausible ways to implement direct comparability. The first treats percent liberal judicial scores as comparable to ADA scores. The second treats Poole and Rosenthal Common Space scores for senators and presidents as comparable to Martin and Quinn scores for justices. 5 The figure presents the estimated preferences of the court median, Senate median and the president for these two approaches over time.
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Even casual observation suggests stark differences between the two approaches. For ex-5 This approach to inter-institutional preference measurement is not endorsed by Poole, Rosenthal, Martin or Quinn; we present it simply as an example of assuming direct comparability across institutions.
6 The ADA and percent liberal measures have been subtracted from one in order to give them the same ideological polarity as the Poole-Rosenthal and Martin-Quinn measures. 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 Year
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Court med. 2 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 Year Why do these immensely influential preference estimates contradict our understandings of the ideology of Supreme Court justices and members of Congress? Why do these measures lack face validity? The problem is that it is very hard to locate preference when the underlying policy agenda is changing. These approaches use only vote data, implicitly assuming that the distributions of vote cutpoints over time do not vary.so may not be well equipped to handle situations in which preferences and agendas shift together. The second factor is that the dimensionality of the Poole and Rosenthal measures vary over time. Their "race dimension" exerted an independent effect on congressional voting from roughly 1940 to 1966 and then was gradually absorbed into the first dimension by the mid-1980s. This means that one cannot use just one of these scores for studies that span the post war era. If one were to use only first dimension scores, one would have a poor measure for issues addressed by the court such as race, busing, school prayer and internal security as these loaded heavily on the second dimension. For example, the Common Space The point of these examples is that measurement matters. As scholars we need to reflect carefully on if and how the preference measures we use are consistent with the political 9 Poole and Rosenthal conceive of their NOMINATE scores as reflecting underlying latent preference dimensions that typically do not change. The mapping of policies onto these dimensions does change, however and the important changes that have occurred in the mapping of policy to the one (and sometimes two) dimensional policy space in the post-war era (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997, 6 and Chapter 5) makes interpretation quite complex.
concepts we are trying to measure. In many cases, the easiest to acquire measures will not be appropriate for the question at hand. For example, in our efforts to isolate political preferences on cases before the court, we cannot use preference measures that imply that the modern Southern Democrats are the same as their segregationist predecessors. Or, in the same spirit, as we try to assess political constraints on the court, we may be reluctant to use preference measures that place the Supreme Court near its conservative peak in a time when it was handing down decidedly liberal opinions.
Generating Comparable Preferences
Our goal is to build a measurement model that can span institutions and time. Key to our approach will be "bridge" observations of judges and elected officials taking positions on cases/votes in other institutions and other periods of time. These observations help us pin down preferences of a diverse set of actors in a common space.
Educational testers face an analogous and mathematically isomorphic problem when trying to create scores that are comparable across students who take exams with different test questions (see e.g. Baker 1992). Educational testers model each student as having some "ability" and each question as having some "difficulty." If every student took the same test, then it would be straightforward to compare student's abilities as they were faced with questions of the same difficulty. However, it is not wise for standardized tests to ask the same questions year in and year out, so they must ask different questions to different cohorts. The challenge is to make these scores comparable. The solution is to have a modest number of questions that are asked across the cohorts. For these overlapping questions, the difficulty is the same, facilitating estimation of ability across test-taking cohorts; this in turn facilitates comparable estimation of the difficulty of different questions.
We pursue an analogous strategy. We model each justice as having some "ideology" and each case as having (as above) some cutpoint. Our "overlapping questions" are of two Figure 2 .7(a). We also include the percentage of the time each of our hypothetical senators and justices votes in a conservative manner as a tool for illustrating again the weakness of assuming direct comparability of ideology scores.
As discussed earlier, we cannot calibrate preferences across the two contexts based only on votes within the respective contexts. However, if we observe the position of the justices and senators on "Case X" we have information that is very helpful. In the example, two justices were liberal and one was conservative on Case X while two senators were liberal and three were conservative on the same case. Using the cutpoint of Case X as a fixed reference, we can align the preferences across the two institutions as in Figure 2 .7(b). Using this basic insight, the statistical model described below incorporates such information in a large-scale fully-specified dichotomous choice statistical model.
Our approach is to find fixed reference points that allow preferences to be estimated even when preferences change over time. It follows a similar reasoning as for the interinstitutional bridges. To see the logic, first suppose that instead of having two separate institutions, we have the same institution at two separate points in time. There may be some overlap of membership, but if we allow preferences to change over time, we will not be able to align preferences across institutions without additional information or assumptions.
One very useful source of information is the existence of cases (such as "Case X") on which individuals at both points in time took positions. This produces comparability just as in Figure 2 .7. For example, when Justice Thomas wrote in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) that Roe was "wrongly decided," he provided an indication his preferences in 1992 relative to Roe, a case decided well before he came to the Court by justices with whom he did not generally overlap.
Incorporating these bridge observations has the additional salutary effect of increasing information about case parameters. As Londregan (1999) emphasized, cutpoint estimates for institutions with a small number of actors -such as the Supreme Court -will be poorly estimated. The best way to mitigate the problem is to add "votes" whenever possible and to incorporate other sources of information about vote parameters (see also Clinton and
Meirowitz 2001).
We also use information based on the relative position of vote cutpoints. Doing this allows us to incorporate substantive information about agenda changes when it is available. We know, for example, that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was more liberal than the 1960 Civil Rights Act which in turn was more liberal than the 1957 Civil Rights Act. Using this information allows us to more precisely measure preferences across time in a way that is comparable across time. (unlike what is in the figure) .
We have many inter-institutional examples. The abortion issue provides several cases for which cutpoints have clear relations. In many of the abortion cases which followed Roe (including, for example, Webster ) the court was asked to rule on legislation that regulated, but did not outlaw abortion. If one thought that states could outlaw abortion as did conservatives on Roe, then logically, states must be able to regulate it in a manner that stops short of outlawing it, as was true in all these cases. Hence, someone to the right of Roe must be to the right on these cases that do less than outlaw abortion, implying the cutpoints of these cases must be to the left of Roe. Sometimes the cutpoint information spans institutions.
For example, senators voted on April 28, 1976 on a "right to life" amendment that deemed fetuses people with legal rights. Voting in favor of this amendment implied that a senators not only thought that states could regulate abortion (which was at issue in Roe v. Wade)
but that states should ban it. Hence, the cutpoint on the right to life vote is to the right of the cutpoint in Roe.
A few other issues account for a large proportion of the substantive cutpoint linkages.
As referenced earlier, civil rights legislation over the years got progressively more liberal; if Let y * itv be the utility difference between the conservative and liberal alternatives. It is
At this point we treat ideology as a single dimensional characteristic of individual justices that best predicts voting. That is, we are measuring revealed preferences, preferences that may be affected by more than the justices' personal ideological preferences. For example, a justice may be affected by stare decisis, by public opinion, by strategic considerations with regard to Congress and so forth. The goal of subsequent chapters is to add such considerations to the framework developed here. 
which implies that
Assuming independence across individuals and votes, the joint posterior probability of the observed data is
where
and g(θ, α, κ) is the prior distribution over the parameters to be estimated.
For cases and votes that are identical across voting bodies (mostly votes on conference legislation taken in the House and Senate) we constrain the cutpoints to be the same by relabeling the votes with a common label. For cases and votes for which we have information on the relative locations of the cutpoints, we constrain the cutpoints to satisfy the inequality constraint implied by the information. This is implemented in the Bayesian sampling process via rejection sampling.
11 This parameter is standard in ideal point estimation theory and its precursor, item response theory (Baker 1992). Votes for which the alternatives are relatively close (meaning (λ C v − λ L v ) is relatively small) will have a low discrimination parameter as the non-spatial error term will be more likely to induce actors with preferences higher than the cutpoint to vote liberally and vice versa. There is a broad consensus that the preferences of at least some justices change over time (Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal and Spaeth 1988) . Therefore for long-serving individuals (individuals who served more than 20 years), we assume that the ideology of individual i at time t is
where the γ parameters are preference parameters to be estimated, and X it is the years the individual has been in office. The model is estimated with Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods. These methods repeatedly sample from the posterior density of the parameter distribution. The mode, mean and standard error of the distribution of the parameters can then easily be derived from the mode, mean and standard error of the sampled observations. The appendix and references provide additional explanation.
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Data The data consist of canonical data sets on court cases and congressional roll calls merged with an originally collected data set of bridge observations. There are 17, 882 bridge observations, including 1, 213 judicial comments on previous cases. The comments reflect the preference of the actor at the time the statement is made.
For both the Congress and the Supreme Court, we look only at votes and cases related to the major topics addressed by the courts in the post-war area, including crime, civil rights, free speech, religion, abortion and privacy. Focusing on these issues allows us to focus on the most relevant areas of political-judicial exchange and to minimize chances that our results are affected by behavior on secondary issues that did not necessarily have the same structure of preferences (Murphy 1962, 75; Dean 2001, 41) . Nonetheless, it seems that in recent years positions on the issues we focus on appear to correlate highly with positions on economic and other matters (see, e.g., Martin and Quinn 2001).
We begin in 1950. Even as more data becomes available, we believe this remains an appropriate starting point as the ideological splits of the New Deal era revolved around economic legislation associated with the New Deal, topics that were quite different than those of the Vinson Court (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) and beyond when "social issues" such as race, civil rights and privacy dominated the court's agenda. Given our assumption of a single policy dimension, we do not want to push too far into the past when this assumption becomes increasingly difficult to defend.
Presidents Presidential positions on Supreme Court cases are drawn from two sources. One is a set of all statements by presidents on Supreme Court cases. We collected these data from presidential public papers, presidential library web sites and other sources. 14 We do not use Solicitor General positions on cases where the United States is a party. When the United States is a party to a case, precedent, the stakes of winning, the sometimes non-voluntary participation, or other non-ideological actors may be behind the position taken by the Solicitor General.
15 Several institutional and historical factors support the use of these filings for this purpose. The overt sources of presidential influence on the Solicitor General are clear: "the clearest and most important institutional linkage is with the President. It is the President who, by statute, nominates the Solicitor General and at whose pleasure he serves. Should he care to, the President has the coercive language to direct the activities of even a reticent Solicitor General" (Cooper 1990, 7) .
These institutional powers may lead to influence even if we seldom see the president coercing the Solicitor General. First, Solicitor General appointees often share the preferences of the appointing president. As one of Reagan's former Solicitors General, Charles Fried, said, "I have no trouble saying what the Attorney General and his crew want me to, because I'm more conservative than they are" (Cooper 1990, 7) . Reagan surely anticipated Fried's preferences before appointing him. Second, even when the preferences of the Solicitor General and the President diverge, the Solicitor General may choose to do the President's bidding, out of deference or out of a desire to avert explicit intervention by the President.
In general, the evidence suggests that Solicitors General follow the desires of presidents. Meinhold and Shull (1998) found that presidential policy statements predicted Solicitor General amicus curiae briefs. In addition, examples in which presidents guide Solicitor General activities sometimes make it to the public sphere. Presidents Clinton and Bush both ordered their Solicitors General to change positions on cases (Fraley 1996, 22) . President Kennedy had frequent contact with Solicitor General Cox (Segal 1989, 142) , and President Eisenhower personally added several sentences to the government's brief in Brown v. Board of Education (Days 1995, 5). President Bush (at the urging of White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales) had the administration brief on Grutter v. Bollinger re-written to be more accepting of affirmative action (Novak 2003) .
In addition, when Solicitors General stray, presidents push them out. Reagan essentially fired Solicitor General Lee when he expressed reluctance in pursuing Reagan's agenda (Norman-Major 1994) . Nixon forced out Solicitor General Griswold in 1972 due to a perception that Griswold was too liberal (Salokar 1992, 41) .
amicus filings by members of Congress, statements in support of or in opposition to specific decisions by the Supreme Court, sponsorship data for legislation that explicitly or implicitly took a position on Supreme Court cases, and roll call votes that explicitly took a position on specific Supreme Court cases. We include all cases with bridge or linkage information and was "important."
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The observations of justices taking positions on cases that arose prior to the justices' arrival on the bench were taken from written opinions. Opinions were identified by (1) searching for the phrases such as "wrongly decided" or "correctly decided" (2) examining every case that overturned precedent and (3) working through issue-specific discussions in legal reference books. An example is Justice Thomas's position on Roe discussed above.
When a case clearly and directly overturned a precedent, a vote in favor of overturning 16 The amicus filings were identified either in the Supreme Court Compendium or with Lexis/Nexus searches we performed. The statements are primarily from an extensive search of the Congressional Record. For example, Sen. Paul Douglas (D, IL) characterized Brown as a "correct and noble decision" (Congressional Record 110: 20910) while almost 100 Southern Democrats signed the Southern Manifesto stating the decision was "a clear abuse of judicial power" (Congressional Record 102: 4459).
17 A case was deemed "important" if the case received news coverage in the New York Times (cite), Congressional Quarterly (cite), bridge observation. There was a twofold reason for limiting the cases in this manner. The effects we are interested in only truly matter if they affect important cases, broadly defined. In addition, the MCMC estimation process is very time consuming and limiting cases reduces the time for each estimation. Among the various robustness analyses reported below are estimates in which the case selection was not limited to important cases; the results do not appear to differ. In order to ensure an adequate number of observations for every year, we include randomly selected cases that are not important for years that would otherwise have a small number of cases. We also do not use cases that cannot be coded on a liberal and conservative scale (Harvey 2008) . Court cases, something that in fact comes to pass in our data. This, however, will not bias the estimation because for the results to be contaminated by selection bias, the error in the selection equation must be correlated with the error in the preference equation (Greene 2000, 18 In the process of making clear his opposition to the decision, then Senator Santorum stated "Every society in the history of man has upheld the institution of marriage as a bond between a man and a woman. Why? Because society is based on one thing: that society is based on the future of the society. And that's what? Children. Monogamous relationships. In every society, the definition of marriage has not ever to my knowledge included homosexuality. That's not to pick on homosexuality. It's not, you know, man on child, man on dog, or whatever the case may be." 976). Selection bias is not induced simply if relatively extreme members are more likely to take positions.
Another possibility that is statistically more troubling is that the preferences of individuals are somehow different when they choose to take positions than when they are forced to vote on cases or roll calls.
19 In this case, the error in the selection equation would be correlated with error in the outcome and selection bias would be possible. This could occur if, for example, a member of Congress only takes positions on court cases in order to look conservative (and does not do that on roll calls, the above notwithstanding). While it would appear reasonable to assume that the public persona politicians would like to exhibit would be similar whether acting on roll calls or other public acts, we cannot know for certain that this is the case. To test for the possibility of selection bias, we compare preferences expressed via roll call votes and preferences expressed via non-vote public positions. To do so, we generate two sets of preference estimates: one based only on Senate roll call votes, and the other based on court data and voluntary senate data such as public statements and amicus filings. Clear differences in preference ordering across these two estimation procedures would indicate that the ordinal ranking of senators based on voluntary observations was markedly different from senatorial behavior on roll-call observations. This does not appear to be the case, however,as the correlation between the two preference estimates is 0.89.
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19 Of course, justices and members of Congress are not forced to vote, but it appears that abstention is costly. A justice who fails to vote without a good reason will probably lose the respect of his or her peers. A member of Congress who abstains may lose respect of other members and may suffer campaign attacks based on low-voting rates.
20 Note that selection bias can occur even if there were no difference in preference distributions between commentators and all members of Congress. That is, a perfectly representative sample of legislators who made comments only when they were on
Preference Estimates
The results from our data collection and estimation procedure are plotted in Figures 21 One needs to be careful in ascribing a single median to the court in a year. In years with an appointment, the median may shift considerably. In later chapters in this book when we need court medians for analytical purposes, we calculate them on a case by case basis depending who was on the court. We can also explore whether apparent anomalies found in other preference estimates recur when using our approach. In contrast to Martin and Quinn's estimates which imply that the court median neared its conservative peak in 1972, our estimates indicate that the court moved consistently to the right in the late sixties and eighties, but was more liberal in the early seventies than it is today (compare our results show clear differences between these two; our results also are consistent with evi-dence that at least some members of Congress changed preferences over time. Bailey (2007) shows that ideal points based on the bridging approach are better able to explain Senate voting on Supreme Court nominations than a Epstein, Lindstadt, Segal and Westerland's (2006) estimation approach that builds on Common Space scores.
There are two factors behind the differences in our results from the Common Space scores.
First and substantively important here and even more so in other projects, our data is limited to "social issues" broadly construed (e.g. civil rights, civil liberties, speech, crime, abortion).
Poole and Rosenthal scores are based on all votes across years in which dimensionality changes. To see to what extent this explains the seemingly better fit with reality for our measures, we estimated Nominate scores based only on the roll calls in the sample. But sample selection is far from the whole story. The Nominate scores from the restricted 22 These scores were estimated with W-Nominate from Poole's Voteview website and using only congressional and presidential data. I fixed Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-MA) as the "left" anchor and Rep. Charles Stenholm (D-TX) as the "up" anchor. Results differed with different dimensionality or anchoring assumptions, but the general pattern discussed here was stable. The methods and data described in this chapter are specifically designed to facilitate careful analysis of whether we believe such results and, as it happens, produce quite different results (note the evolution of Senate preferences in Figure 2 .11).
Conclusion
Accurate measurement is essential for quantitative theory testing. If we cannot characterize preferences with confidence, we cannot determine the forces that shape them or how they in turn affect outcomes. In the case of research crossing institutional boundaries and spanning time, it has been particularly challenging to generate comparable preference estimates, a fact that has left several research agendas waiting on development of valid preference measures that are comparable over time and across institutions.
In this chapter, we offer two contributions. First, we show that measurement matters. We highlight theoretical challenges and show the relevance of these issues for active research.
Ad hoc and equally plausible approaches to inter-institutional comparisons yield starkly different conclusions about the relative policy preferences of the president and congressional medians. Martin and Quinn's and Poole and Rosenthal's widely-used preference estimates imply temporal preference relations that are, in some respects, hard to believe. The examples and analysis here not only set the stage for the rest of the book, but also point scholars to be more critically reflective about the preference measures they use.
Second, we provide a method and data for producing preference estimates that are comparable across time and institutions. We use three types of information: "bridge" observations of actors taking positions on cases or votes in another institution; "bridge" observations of actors taking positions on cases or votes in a previous time period; and substantive information about the relationship of vote cutpoints over time. These data are incorporated into a spatial ideal point model estimated via Bayesian Markov chain simulation methods. The payoff is that the method produces preference estimates that avoid the anomalies found with other widely-used measures, measures that can be used to address a broad array of questions in the literature.
